United States v. Glen Prince

── United States v. Glen Prince ── Case No.: 23-3155 Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Date: April 02, 2026 Category: General In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-3155 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GLEN PRINCE, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 22 CR 240 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2024 — DECIDED APRIL 2, 2026 ____________________ Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), makes it a crime for any person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprison- ment for a term exceeding one year” to possess a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce. An indictment charged Glen Prince with violating this statute, but a district court dis- missed the indictment after concluding that §922(g)(1) is 2 No. 23-3155 invalid “on its face”—that is, in every possible application— under the Second Amendment to the Constitution. 700 F. Supp. 3d 663 (N.D. Ill. 2023). The United States has appealed. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), held that the Second Amendment creates personal rights. The Court pointedly added that “longstanding prohibitions on the pos- session of firearms by felons” are valid. Id. at 626, 635. When extending Heller to the states, the Court in McDonald v. Chi- cago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (lead opinion), reassured readers that all of the reservations and provisos in Heller retain valid- ity. In a more recent Second Amendment decision, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), Justices Alito and Kavanaugh, whose votes were essential to the majority, wrote separately to say that Bruen did not change anything about Heller. See 597 U.S. at 72 (Alito, J., con- curring) (“Our holding decides nothing about who may law- fully possess a firearm or the requirements that must be met to buy a gun. Nor does it decide anything about the kinds of weapons that people may possess. Nor have we disturbed an- ything that we said in Heller or [McDonald] about restrictions that may be imposed on the possession or carrying of guns.”); id. at 80–81 (Kavanaugh, J., joined by the Chief Justice, con- curring) (endorsing the statement in Heller about the propri- ety of denying firearms to felons). And in the Court’s most recent Second Amendment decision, United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), the Justices held that people who have been adjudicated as dangerous, as by the issuance of a protec- tive order, may be disarmed. The existence of a felony convic- tion is another plausible indicator of danger. None of the Supreme Court’s decisions expressly ad- dresses the validity of §922(g)(1), and it is chancy for an No. 23-3155 3 inferior court to take dicta (such as the statements in Heller) as the equivalent of holdings. Bruen changed Heller’s approach to be more historical, and Rahimi recast Bruen to be more risk- centric (after observing that American history evinces this em- phasis on danger). Given the current state of the law, repre- sented by Rahimi, it is difficult to conclude that §922(g)(1) can- not be applied to anyone, even a person with a string of con- victions suggesting grave danger. Say, multiple convictions for murder committed using explosives or machine guns. Here’s another, from Fields v. Gilley, 121 F.4th 598, 600 (7th Cir. 2024): “In 2001, Fields was in federal custody, on the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm, when he bribed a correctional officer with a $5,000 payment i